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Article 3

Realism, Rationality and Justice Byron White:
Three Easy Cases
Allan Ides*
There are numerous perspectives from which to examine
the jurisprudence of a Supreme Court Justice, and each
perspective offers its own particular insight into the judicial
process. I have suggested elsewhere that the jurisprudence of
Justice Byron White can be explored effectively by reference to
the methods and philosophy of legal realism.' This suggestion
is premised on the utility of realism as a device for examining
the underpinnings of a judicial opinion as well as on a
perception that to some extent Justice White practiced the art
of realism in his decisionmaking. I do not claim that Justice
White was a legal realist in the freewheeling style of Justice
William 0.Douglas, nor would it be accurate to freight Justice
White's opinions with all the baggage of legal realist
philo~ophy.~White's opinions do, however, exhibit certain
~ particular, Justice
characteristics of the realist t r a d i t i ~ n .In
White tended to approach cases from the facts up rather than
from the doctrine down. The driving force behind doctrine was,
generally speaking, not concepts, but facts and policies.
Similarly, the legitimacy of any particular doctrine rested upon
that doctrine's effectiveness in exposing those facts and policies
that percolated beneath the surface of legal controversies.
White's approach to rationality review under the Equal
Protection Clause provides a good example of his realistic style.
While the traditional model of rationality review is
characterized by a judicial deference that presumes the
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1. Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALEL.J. 419
(1993).
2. See JAMESE. HERGET,AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE,
1870-1970: A HISTORY
147-227 (1990); LAURAKALMAN,LEGALREALISMAT YALE, 1927-1960, at 3-44
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existence of circumstances justifying the legislative
classification being challenged, White's applications of
rationality review did not rest on hypothetical possibilities, but
instead required a factually supportable link between the
legislative judgment and the challenged classification. The
distinction is between rationalization and reasoned judgment.
The former rests upon speculation; the latter requires a
consideration of actual facts. Of course, the exercise of reasoned
judgment involves something more than the application of a
mathematical formula, and the policies animating the
judgment are as much a part of the reasoning process as are
the factual underpinnings of that judgment. Consistent with
the foregoing, Justice White's equal protection opinions reflect
an insistence upon a rational connection between facts and law
as well as an appreciation of the policy issues at stake in the
underlying controversies.
Sun Antonio School District v. ~ o d r i g u e zinvolved
~
an
equal protection challenge to a state's school-financing plan.
Under the plan, the amount of financing available to a school
district depended on the real property wealth of that district.
The result was the creation of large disparities between the
funding of relatively rich and relatively poor school districts. In
assessing the constitutionality of the discrimination, the Court
applied a standard "two-tiered" doctrinal analysis. The upper
tier of strict scrutiny was available only to that limited class of
cases involving either a suspect classification or a fundamental
right. All other cases would be assessed under a minimal
rationality test that presumed the legitimacy of government
action. Since the Court found neither a suspect class-the law
did not discriminate against any definable class of poor
people5-nor a fundamental right-education was not deemed
to be such a right6-it applied the rational basis test and
concluded that the disparate funding rationally advanced the
state's legitimate goal of encouraging "a large measure of
participation in and control of each district's schools at the
The Court did not explain how the state's interest
local level.yy7
was rationally advanced by limiting the ability of certain
localities t o raise funds for education; rather, the Court seemed

4. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
5. Id. at 18-28.
6. Id. at 35-37.
7. Id. at 49-53.
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to set the facts aside in order to fully implement the policy of
deference thought to be at the heart of the rational basis test.
Justice White's dissent was fact-intensive and far from
deferential. He specifically described the "major disparities in
spendable funds" available to property-rich districts and t o
property-poor districts and explained how the state's financing
scheme made it impossible-by virtue of a state-imposed ceiling
on the maximum tax rate-for property-poor districts to match
the funds available to property-rich d i s t r i ~ t sHe
. ~ noted as well
that the magnitude of differences could not be ignored,
"particularly since the State itself consider[ed] it so important
to provide opportunities to exceed the minimum state
As t o the legitimacy of the state's
educational e~penditures."~
interest of preserving local control over education, White voiced
no disagreement. The question for White, however, was
whether the financing plan rationally advanced that interest.
"It is not enough that the Texas system before us seeks t o
achieve the valid, rational purpose of maximizing local
initiative; the means chosen by the State must also be
rationally related to the end sought to be achieved."1° In
applying that test, White looked to the reality of the
circumstances:
The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that it
provides a meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like
school districts but almost none to Edgewood and those other
districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these
latter districts, no matter how desirous parents are of
supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is
impossible to do so through the use of the real estate property
tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly fails to extend
a realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is
the only revenue-raising mechanism extended to school
districts, is practically and legally unavailable."

Thus White's conclusion that the state law violated the Equal
Protection Clause did not rely upon strict scrutiny or upon the
sliding scale of values described in Justice Marshall's
dissent.lz Rather, White's conclusion derived from a realistic
8 . Id. at
9. Id. at
10. Id. at
11. Id. at
12. Id. at

64-67.
69.
67.
64-65.

70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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appraisal of how the state financing system actually
functioned, and the extent t o which that system could be said
t o advance the legitimate goal of local initiative. Simply put, for
White, a system of financing that both discourages and largely
prevents local initiative cannot be said t o advance the goal of
local initiative in any rational fashion. From a policy
perspective the law was equally irrational: the promotion of
quality education is hardly advanced by a scheme that
precludes reasonable latitude for the financial support of such
education.
White's approach in Sun Antonio School District was not,
apparently, the type to draw much academic attention. He
discovered no suspect class and uncovered no fundamental
right. Nor did he advocate a novel methodology for assessing
equal protection claims. Instead, he used the facts to describe a
reasoning process that led him to a particular conclusion
consistent with the plain terms of rationality review. As with
his approach t o other doctrines, rationality review was not used
as a construct distinct from the underlying transaction or as a
thesis of deference that exalted theory over facts. Rather,
rationality review was used as a means of fairly and
reasonably assessing the circumstances giving rise to the
claimed equal protection violation. Doctrine served the facts,
and not the other way around. The majority, adhering to the
more traditional "hands-off approach, reversed these priorities
in service to the deferential rational basis doctrine.
Justice White's fact-intensive approach t o rationality
review surfaced again in his dissent in New York Transit
Authority v. Beazer.13 In that case, the Court upheld the
Transit Authority's blanket exclusion from employment of all
persons receiving methadone treatment. The lower courts had
held that certain methadone users-those that had successfully
completed a year of treatment-should not be included within
the excluded class since such individuals presented no special
employment risks. The Court disagreed. According to the
Court, even assuming that such individuals could be gainfully
employed without risk, the policy judgment of where to draw
the line on employment of former heroin addicts rested with
the Transit Authority.14 The Equal Protection Clause did not
require the type of precision demanded by the lower courts. As
13. 440 U.S.568 (1979).
14. Id. at 587-94.
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such, the majority's approach was quite similar to that adopted
by the Court in Sun Antonio School District, and consistent
with that case a policy of deference promoted rationalization
over reasoned judgment.
Justice White's dissent began with the facts. It focused
upon the district court's findings of fact which, White pointed
out, were affirmed by the court of appeals as having
overwhelming support in the evidence:
The District Court found that the evidence conclusively
established that petitioners exclude from employment all
persons who are successfully on methadone maintenancethat is, those who after one year are "free of the use of heroin,
other illicit drugs, and problem drinking,"-and those who
have graduated from methadone programs and remain drug
free for less than five years; that past or present successful
methadone maintenance is not a meaningful predictor of poor
performance or conduct in most job categories; that
petitioners could use their normal employee-screening
mechanisms to separate the successfully maintained users
from the unsuccessful; and that petitioners do exactly that for
other groups that common sense indicates might also be
suspect employees. . . . I t bears repeating, then, that both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals found that those who
have been maintained on methadone for a t least a year and
who are free from the use of illicit drugs and alcohol can
easily be identified through normal personnel procedures and,
for a great many jobs, are a s employable as and present no
more risk than applicants from the general population.15

Since the Transit Authority claimed that employability was its
goal, the question for Justice White was whether the
discrimination against successful methadone users bore a
rational relationship to that goal: "The question before us is the
rationality of placing successfully maintained or recently cured
persons in the same category as those just attempting to escape
heroin addiction or who have failed to escape it, rather than in
with the general p~pulation.'"~Given the findings of fact,
White concluded that the only reasonable categorization of
successful methadone users was in the general population. The
majority's contrary conclusion was premised on the legitimacy
of the overall exclusion of drug users; but, according to White,
15. Id. at 602-04 (citation omitted; footnote omitted).
16. Id. at 605.
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regardless of the legitimacy of that policy, rationality review
required an assessment of the precise classification before the
Court-the exclusion of successful methadone users-and some
reasonable showing that that exclusion advanced the state's
interest in employability. The Transit Authority had made no
such showing.
As in San Antonio School District, White's approach in
Beazer insisted upon a careful assessment of the facts as they
related to the state's claimed goals. In San Antonio School
District, the state's school-financingplan created a system that
placed seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the path of local
initiative-the
purported state goal. In Beazer, the law
categorized in a fashion that was premised upon assumed and
factually inaccurate differences between various groups. In
both cases, the legislative classification was entitled t o no
deference due to an absence of reasoned judgment on behalf of
the legislature. A contrary conclusion would place the law
above reality; it would exalt theory and doctrine over the actual
circumstances to which the law was t o be applied.
Justice White's dissents in San Antonio School District and
Beazer provided a foundation for his majority opinion in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, ~nc.'? At issue in
Cleburne was a city's denial of a special use permit for the
operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. Justice
White, writing for the Court, declined t o fmd mental
retardation a quasi-suspect class, but nonetheless, applying the
rational basis standard, found the denial of the use permit
invalid. The opinion reveals two important characteristics of
White's jurisprudence. First, his unwillingness to define mental
retardation as a quasi-suspect class was premised on what he
perceived as the general impropriety of close judicial scrutiny of
legislative choices that are based on relevant considerations.
The trait of mental retardation was, according t o White, quite
often relevant given the varieties and complexities of mental
retardation as well as the need for distinctive treatment of
some of those so classified. An elevated level of scrutiny,
however, would place the judiciary in a position of second
guessing relevant policy choices made by those in a better
position t o make such choices.
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Next, the absence of a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification did not permit the controversy t o trail off into the
abyss of rationalization. Rationality review did not grant the
city a license to classify the mentally retarded in an arbitrary
or irrational manner. Again, the facts were of critical
importance. The city claimed t o have relied upon four factors in
denying the use permit, none of which, the Court concluded,
satisfied the standard of rationality. For example, the city's
assertion that the home would be in "a five hundred year flood
plain"18 failed to show any rational distinction between a
group home for the mentally retarded and other group living
arrangements-nursing
homes, homes for convalescents,
sanitariums, hospitals-for
which a permit would not be
required.19 Similarly irrational was the city's expressed
concern with the size of the home and the number of occupants.
Since the city imposed no such requirements on other group
living arrangements, "[tlhe question is whether it is rational t o
treat the mentally retarded differently. It is true that they
suffer disability not shared by others; but why this difference
warrants a density regulation that others need not observe is
not at all apparent."20Overall, the gist of White's opinion was
that the governmental action was based on nothing more than
irrational, rank prejudice against the mentally retarded. As
such the denial of a use permit was an exercise of arbitrary
power and could not stand consistent with the Constitution.
The most surprising thing about the Cleburne decision is
not that Justice White found the City's actions unconstitutional, but that the majority of the Court agreed with
his less than deferential application of rationality review. From
the perspective of Justice White's overall jurisprudence,
Cleburne represents but one more example of his penchant for
the realistic appraisal of fact and policy and of his insistence
that the law reflect true, reasoned judgment. The Court's
acceptance of this approach in the context of rationality review,
on the other hand, represents a striking departure from the
more formalistic jurisprudence of deference one usually
associates with the post-Lochner era.
What is one to make of these three, relatively obscure
opinions? None of them establishes new theoretical boundaries;
18. Id. at 449.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 449-50.
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none of them offers new doctrinal perspectives; none of them
creates a novel model of analysis. Yet all of them provide
powerful examples of reasoned analysis; and each of them
demonstrates, in separate contexts, the ultimate importance of
a realistic, fact-based jurisprudence. If a premise of legal
realism is that law is sometimes nothing more than a
subterfuge for the exercise of raw or arbitrary power, especially
law stated in doctrinal abstractions, then White's opinions in
S a n Antonio School District, Beazer, and Cleburne, can be seen
as exemplars of legal realism's challenge to law as so
constructed. Indeed, his opinion for the Court in Cleburne
appears to incorporate, as part of the equal protection
guarantee, the method of realism t h a t exposes legal
abstractions and thereby uncovers the mask of the law. The
method is, of course, the phil~sophy.~'As so conceived,
rationality review is neither more nor less than a judicial
technique used to determine whether the law being challenged
is premised on reasonable, fact-based judgment or merely on
unsustainable prejudice or arbitrary power. As such, rationality
review, as practiced by Justice White, represents the
quintessence of legal realism.

21. The words of Karl Llewellyn seem apropos: "Realism is not a philosophy,
but a technology. That is why it is eternal. The fresh look is always the fresh
hope. The fresh inquiry into results is always the needed check-up." KARL
LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON
LAWTRADITION
510 (1960). Of course, a belief in "fresh
inquiry" is itself a philosophy of some sort. In this sense, the technology of realism
is but a reflection of that underlying philosophy.

